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I. INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court is a work in progress. The October 2008 Supreme
Court term will be only the third in which both Chief Justice John
Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito have sat together for the
entire term. 1 Any assessment of the Court at this point is necessarily
tentative and somewhat impressionistic. The data from which one can
draw conclusions is quite limited and not necessarily representative of
the Court’s work. A given justice’s current behavior on the Court is not
necessarily indicative of the future, as some justices “grow” or evolve
once on the bench. 2 Changes in personnel can also alter the Court’s
internal dynamic and with unpredictable effects. 3
† Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., 1991, Yale University; J.D., 2000,
George Mason University. The author would like to thank Jonathan Entin, Michael
Greve, and B. Jessie Hill for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any remaining
errors or inanities are sole responsibility of the author.
1. Samuel Alito was sworn in as the 110th Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on
January 31, 2006, and only participated in part of the October Term 2005. See Charles
Babington, Alito Is Sworn in on High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at A01, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401015.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
2. See Lee Epstein, et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who,
When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (documenting the
frequency of “ideological drift” by Supreme Court Justices). According to one recent
study examining the voting patterns of Supreme Court justices from 1937-2005,
“ideological drift is pervasive.” Id. at 1486. The most obvious contemporary example of
this would be Justice David Souter, who voted more frequently with the “conservative”
justices on the Court in his first few terms on the Court than he does today. Id. at 1508-09
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Any assessment of the Roberts Court at age three is necessarily
tentative and preliminary. Yet there is a tendency toward premature
pronouncements and exaggerated assessments. Court commentators
exhibit a reflex to cast the Court in a predetermined narrative about its
prospects and pronouncements. This same tendency produces overly
confident and conclusory assessments that stray beyond the available
evidence. Small doctrinal shifts are presented as seismic changes; ripples
in the Court’s jurisprudence are proclaimed tsunamis. Editorials and
pundits proclaim trends and transformations that have yet to manifest
themselves.
This tendency was on display at the close of the October Term (OT)
2006 as court commentators proclaimed the arrival of a triumphant
conservative majority on the Supreme Court. Jeffrey Toobin wrote of a
“dramatically more conservative” Supreme Court with a majority intent
on launching a conservative “counterrevolution” in American law. 4 The
Washington Post reported a “steady and well-documented turn to the
right.” 5 Ronald Dworkin warned of an “unbreakable phalanx” of
conservative justices 6 and The New York Times’ Linda Greenhouse
reported that the confirmations of Roberts and Alito had created the
“Court that conservatives had long yearned for and that liberals feared.” 7
Reports of a conservative ascendance are premature. OT 2006
certainly featured numerous 5-4 decisions, many of which produced what
could be called “conservative” results. 8 Yet there were also substantial
(stating that Justice Souter was the median justice on the Court when first appointed but
“has grown strikingly more liberal with nearly each passing term”). A similar trend was
observed with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Id. at 1526 (stating that Justice O’Connor
“made a slow and gradual move to the left” after her first ten years on the Court).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 569 (2003). As Professor Merrill observed,
one characteristic of the later Rehnquist Court was the unprecedented level of continuity
in the Court’s lineup. Id. at 573.
4. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 8,
324 (2007).
5. Robert Barnes, A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define Court This Term,
WASH. POST, Jul. 1, 2007, at A07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063000795.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX: THE COURT’S NEW RIGHTWING BLOC 47 (2008).
7. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/washington/01scotus.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/S/Stevens,%20John%20Paul
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
8. See Lee Epstein, et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why
Conservatives Should Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L.
REV. 651, 652 (2008) (noting that “the 2006 term, in particular, was a good one for
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victories for “liberal” positions the proportion of cases in which
conservative positions prevailed was not out of line with prior years. 9
More importantly, the Court’s slim docket that term was hardly
representative of the full range of issues the Court confronts. Only one
year later commentators were forced to reassess as OT 2007 produced
fewer ideologically divided decisions in which the conservative justices
carried the day. 10 It is difficult to characterize the Court that produced
Kennedy v. Louisiana 11 and Boumediene v. Bush 12 as particularly
“conservative” or “right-wing.”
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky makes a substantial contribution to the
narrative of conservative ascendance in The Roberts Court at Age
Three. 13 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito “have been everything
that conservatives could have dreamed of and liberals could have
feared,” he writes. 14 The two newest justices are forging “a solid
conservative voting majority” on the Court. 15 The result is a Court that is
“notably more conservative” than its predecessors on most contentious
questions. 16 It is, Dean Chemerinsky claims, “the most conservative
Court since the mid-1930s.” 17
To say Dean Chemerinsky overstates his case is an understatement.
Even assuming one can offer a definitive assessment of the Roberts
Court’s first three years, there is little support for the claim it is the “most

conservatives,” but that “empirical scrutiny of the Court’s voting patterns reveals no
significant distinctions between the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts”).
9. For instance, the five most conservative justices on the Court in a majority of the
term’s 5-4 cases in OT 05 (fifty-five percent), OT 00 (fifty-four percent), and OT 99
(sixty-six percent). Perhaps more notable, in OT 99, the Court’s four most liberal justices
only prevailed in one of the term’s twenty-one 5-4 decisions in OT 99. See SCOTUSblog,
End-of-Term “Super StatPack—OT06, June 28, 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2009).
10. This is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler, What Happened to the “Conservative
Court”?, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 30, 2008), available at http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTM3OGI1MzNmMDJkOTdhM2QzZjU2NjBiMjFiMmRhNTM= (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
11. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), petition for reh’g denied 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
12. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
13. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947
(2008).
14. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 956.
15. Id. at 955.
16. Id. at 956. Dean Chemerinsky further asserts that: “The one area where the
Roberts Court has not been conservative is in its rulings against the Bush
Administration’s actions as to the Guantanamo detainees.” Id.
17. Id. at 962.
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conservative” in seven decades, however “conservative” is defined. 18
Even if one evaluates the Court’s ideological orientation solely with the
evidence Dean Chemerinsky offers, the claim buckles. Viewed in light of
the Roberts Court’s entire record thus far, the charge falls apart.
The Roberts Court has issued its share of conservative rulings,
though most of these have been relatively modest. 19 At the same time, it
has issued many decisions that are quite liberal. 20 Among other things,
the Roberts Court has: issued the most expansive and permissive
standing opinion since the 1970s; 21 invalidated the application of the
death penalty based, in part, on appeals to international law; 22 and
engaged in the most aggressive exercise of judicial review of wartime
measures adopted by the political branches in our nation’s history. 23
Whatever one’s views of the merits of these decisions, they are not the
product of the “most conservative” Court in over a generation. 24
Accepting the limited ability to draw definitive conclusions about the
Roberts Court at this point, it is fair to say the Court is moderately more
conservative than it had been immediately before. Chief Justice Roberts
has not shown himself to be any more conservative than his predecessor
and mentor, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. If anything, he is
slightly more deferential to precedent. Justice Alito, on the other hand, is
both more conservative and consistent than was Justice O’Connor. Those
18. The terms “liberal” and “conservative” are used throughout this paper in
accordance with the common vernacular. It should be noted, however, that these labels
are often misleading and imprecise when used to describe court decisions and doctrines,
particularly insofar as these labels are affixed to the results or practical consequences of
decisions rather than to the holdings or interpretive methodologies employed by the Court
or individual justices. So, for instance, while judicial decisions unfavorable to criminal
defendants are often characterized as “conservative,” some conservative justices have
authored opinions quite protective of criminal defendants. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect
radiation of heat from a private home is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment)
(opinion by Scalia, J.); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that
criminal forfeiture constituted excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment)
(opinion by Thomas, J.).
19. See infra notes 65-121 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
21. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The most
expansive and permissive standing opinion in the Court’s history was United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Problems, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See also
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is SCRAP
for a new generation.”).
22. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641.
23. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
24. See L. Epstein, et al., Bush Imprint, supra note 8, at 652 (noting similarity
between Rehnquist and Roberts Courts).
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areas in which the Court has become slightly more conservative are those
on which Justice Alito is to Justice O’Connor’s right. Nonetheless, the
confirmation of Justice Alito has yet to produce anything approaching
revolutionary change, in part because Justice Kennedy remains a
moderate median justice on many issues. Thus the most we can say at
this point is that the Roberts Court appears moderately more conservative
than its immediate predecessors, but remains under construction.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Part I places the
current Court and its docket in broader historical and institutional
context, with a particular focus on the Court’s diminished caseload. Part
II challenges Dean Chemerinsky’s central claim that the Roberts Court at
age three has shown itself to be “the most conservative Court since the
mid-1930s.” This part demonstrates that Dean Chemerinsky’s claim is
difficult to maintain even considering alternative potential definitions of
what it would mean for this to be the “most conservative” Court. Part III
focuses on Dean Chemerinsky’s subordinate claim that the Roberts Court
is exceedingly or notably “pro-business.” This part considers what it
would mean to have a “pro-business” court, and whether the current
Court fits this definition. Part IV considers Dean Chemerinsky’s
additional suggestion that the Roberts Court should be known as the
“Kennedy Court,” and its implications for his broader thesis. This Essay
closes with an assessment of what can—and cannot—be said about the
Roberts Court at age three, and offers some preliminary thoughts on how
the Court may continue to evolve in the future.
II. THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING DOCKET
A striking aspect of the Roberts Court is the size of its docket. This
was many years in the making. Over the past several decades, the
Supreme Court’s docket has declined dramatically. During the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, the number of cases heard and decided by the
Court was cut in half, from approximately 150 cases per term in the
1980s to seventy-six in OT 2004. 25 While Chief Justice Roberts
indicated he would like the Court to accept more cases for review during
his confirmation hearings, it has yet to happen. 26 The Court issued
25. See David M. O’Brien, The Rehnquist Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 81
JUDICATURE 58, 58 (1997) (“In the 1995 and 1996 terms, the Court . . . decided just
[ninety] cases by written opinions each term, half the number of a decade ago.”);
SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2 (“The number of decisions after argument for previous
Terms are . . . [seventy-six] (OT04) . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. Supreme Court Accepting Fewer Cases,
FOXNews.com (June 3, 2006), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198065,00.html?sPage=fnc/us/supremecourt (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (“Chief Justice
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opinions after briefing and argument in only sixty-eight and sixty-seven
cases in the past two terms. 27
Any evaluation of the Roberts Court at this point must account for its
small docket. As Dean Chemerinsky notes, the number of cases decided
by the Court after briefing and argument is at its lowest point in over
fifty years. 28 At the time of this writing the Court has accepted
significantly more cases than at this point during OT 2006 and OT
2007, 29 and the Court has scheduled afternoon oral arguments for the
first time during Chief Justice Roberts’ tenure, 30 but it is unclear whether
this indicates an increase in the size of the docket or mere frontloading of
arguments so as provide more time to craft and revise opinions.
There are several potential explanations for the reduction in cases
heard by the Court. Among those Dean Chemerinsky identifies are:
increasing ideological congruity between the Supreme Court and the
federal courts of appeals, 31 strategic voting by individual justices, 32 a
decreased demand for certiorari by the Solicitor General’s office, 33 and
the reliance of most justices on the certiorari pool. 34 Another factor is
Congress’ constriction of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1988. 35 By
making a greater portion of the Court’s docket discretionary, Congress
virtually ensured that the docket would shrink (though I doubt anyone
who supported this revision expected it would shrink quite so much).
Among the causes of the docket’s decline, the cert pool is
particularly interesting. The pool was created in OT 1972 by Chief
John Roberts said last fall he would like to see the U.S. Supreme Court take up more
cases. So far, however, his arrival has had the opposite effect.”).
27. See SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2; Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP,
SCOTUSblog, Super StatPack—OT07, June 26, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/superstatpackot07.pdf (last visited Mar.
9, 2009).
28. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 948.
29. See FINDLAW, Supreme Court Docket: 2008 Term, available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/docket/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
30. Marcia Coyle, High Court, High Stakes, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at col. 2
(“Also strikingly different is the return of afternoon oral arguments: four in October and
three in November.”).
31. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 950.
32. Id. at 951.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Pub. Law 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). See also Bennett Boskey & Eugene
Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81
(1988) (observing that legislative revision “eliminates substantially all the Court’s socalled mandatory or obligatory appeal jurisdiction” such that “[w]ith but the most minor
of exceptions, the only path to Supreme Court review of federal and state court decisions
is now by way of petitioning for a writ of certiorari”).
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Justice Burger, who reportedly sought “to cut back on the Court’s work
load.” 36 In his view, preparing memoranda on the 4,500 or so petitions
for certiorari filed each year was too much work for each justice’s
chambers. 37 Most of the current justices must share this sentiment
because almost all of the justices partake of the pool. 38 Justice Stevens
has declined to participate in the pool for some time and, in 2008, Justice
Alito announced that he would get out of the pool as well. 39
Dean Chemerinsky is almost certainly correct that the pool reduces
the number of cert petitions the Court accepts. Having only one clerk
read a petition for certiorari and draft a memorandum for multiple
chambers reduces the likelihood that any given petition will be accepted.
This is particularly true if, as Dean Chemerinsky and others suggest, the
Court’s institutional norms discourage clerks from recommending a
certiorari grant. 40 It is apparently seen as worse to recommend granting
an unworthy case than to pass over one deserving of Supreme Court
review.
Dean Chemerinsky may inadvertently identify another reason for
fewer certiorari grants when he notes that when a justice does not
participate in the cert pool it is easier to select cases with an eye toward a
desired outcome. 41 Before the pool was created, Dean Chemerinsky
notes, the clerks in each Justice’s chambers may have reviewed petitions
in accordance with their Justice’s preferences, as opposed to more
neutral criteria. 42 This may have resulted in cert grant recommendations
based upon the idiosyncratic (or ideological) preferences of individual
justices, and may have increased the potential for strategic behavior in
the certiorari process.
36. BOB WOODWARD AND SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 272 (1979).
37. Id. Not all of the justices agreed. Justice Brennan opposed creation of the cert
pool and Justice Stewart opted not to participate on the recommendation of his clerks. Id.
at 272-73.
38. Tony Mauro, Justice Alito Changes Mind, Gets Out of the Pool, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2008.
39. Id.
40. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 951-52; Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket
Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2 (last visited Mar.
9, 2009).
41. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 951 (“Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer may decide to vote in favor of certiorari only when they think that they have a
reasonable chance at ultimately getting agreement from Justice Kennedy or another
member on the Court. The same, of course, could be true for the more conservative
Justices.”).
42. Id. at 951-52.
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With a certiorari pool, worthy cases may get overlooked, but the
requirement that each clerk write a memo for multiple justices with
different judicial philosophies may depoliticize the certiorari process.
The requirement that each clerk write a memo for multiple justices is
likely to encourage the drafting of memos that focus on “neutral” criteria
for certiorari, and discourage memos recommending cert so as to
overturn faulty precedent or change the direction of the law. It seems
plausible that memos written for the pool are less likely to be written
with an eye toward producing predetermined, desired results.
Dean Chemerinsky decries the Court’s incredible shrinking docket
because it means “more major legal questions must wait a longer time
before being settled.” 43 He is correct that this “has enormous
implications for lawyers, judges, and for the nation,” 44 but not all of
them are negative. While the Court’s relative reluctance to grant
certiorari means that circuit splits and doctrinal conflicts may persist for
a greater period, it also means that legal questions have greater time to
percolate. If more circuit courts have the opportunity to consider a
question of first impression, there is a greater likelihood of a circuit split
developing, but the justices may also benefit from assessing the
frequency with which a given question recurs and from having more of
their Article III colleagues consider a given question. Delaying a grant of
certiorari may also afford the political branches an opportunity to resolve
a given controversy, thereby obviating any need for the Court to hear a
case.
Downsizing the docket is important for academics and court
watchers, too. A shrunken docket, in any given year, provides a less
reliable picture of the Court’s jurisprudence. As the Court reviews fewer
cases, each individual term provides a less representative snapshot of the
Court’s work. Fewer cases mean a smaller, less-representative data
sample. As a consequence, a handful of terms are not representative of
the wide range of issues that come before the Court.
The shrinking docket should make us particularly reluctant to
embrace sweeping judgments about the Court’s trajectory based on any
handful of terms. The first three years of the Roberts Court have seen
quite a few significant cases, 45 but many important issues were absent.
The Roberts Court has not considered enumerated powers cases of the
sort that characterized the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism,” nor has
it had the opportunity to rule on Fifth Amendment takings, the separation
43. Id. at 948.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229; EPA, 549 U.S.
497.
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of church and state, commercial speech, homosexual rights, and a host of
other important contemporary issues.
The brief history of the Roberts Court amply illustrates the danger of
relying upon a single term to evaluate the Court’s trajectory. Viewed in
isolation, OT 2006 appeared to present a fiercely divided Court, driven
along ideological lines, in which conservatives tended to triumph. 46 Yet
the term before, the Court was a model of civility and nearly
unprecedented unanimity. 47 And one year later, the Roberts Court defied
ideological caricature. OT 2005 may be sui generis because Justices
O’Connor and Alito split their term. 48 The difference between OT 2006
and OT 2007, however, was not turnover in personnel, but a different
mix of cases and associated issues.
Commentators were too quick to draw stark conclusions from the
apparent divisions on the Court on display in OT 2006. Only one-in-four
decisions was unanimous that term, 49 and one-in-three was decided 54. 50 This is hardly an unprecedented level of division, however. Both OT
2004 and OT 2001 saw approximately one-third of the Court’s decisions
decided 5-4 as well. 51 If anything was unprecedented it was the
unusually high percentage of unanimous rulings—forty-five percent 52 —
and low number of 5-4 decisions—thirteen percent 53 —during Chief
Justice Roberts’s first term, OT 2005, that inflated expectations.
This is not to deny the very real doctrinal divisions on the Court.
SCOTUSblog’s analysis of the “rate of dissension”—a measure of the
number of dissents per case—found OT 2006 the most divided in recent
years, barely edging out OT 2001, 1.82 dissents per case to 1.81. 54 This
and other measures of the Court’s may be magnified by the Court’s evershrinking docket, however. As the Court grants fewer cases, those that
remain on the docket may be more difficult, contentious, and closely
fought on the margin. The oral statements from Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer delivering dissents in high-profile cases in OT 2006 may have
been unusual, but they were mild compared to some of the fiery
statements from prior years, as when the Court handed down its
46. See SCOTUSblog, supra note 9.
47. See id.
48. See infra note 1 and accompanying text.
49. See SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 3.
50. See id. at 2.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 3.
54. Jason Harrow, Measuring Divisiveness in OT 2006, SCOTUSblog, July 2, 2007,
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/measuring-divisiveness-in-ot06/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2009).
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decisions in two abortion-related cases, Stenberg v. Carhart 55 and Hill v.
Colorado. 56
OT 2007 was neither particularly conservative nor starkly divided.
Approximately one third of the Court’s decisions were decided by a 5-4
vote during OT 2006. 57 In OT 2007, however, the Court split 5-4 only
seventeen percent of the time. 58 Moreover, only a handful of these
decisions yielded ideologically predictable divisions. 59 In cases
concerning criminal sentencing, 60 the definition of money laundering, 61
age discrimination, 62 and federal sovereign immunity, 63 the justices split
5-4, but did not divide into “liberal” and “conservative” camps. 64 It is
simply too soon to know whether OT 2006 or OT 2007 provides a better
picture of the “real” Roberts Court—assuming either is representative of
the Court’s overall judicial ideology—and there are reasons to lean
toward the latter.
III. “THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURT SINCE THE MID-1930S”?
Dean Chemerinsky’s primary and most provocative claim is that the
Roberts Court at age three is “the most conservative Court since the mid1930s.” 65 By way of explanation, he writes:
What does it mean to say that the Court is more conservative
than its predecessor Courts, the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren
Courts? It is notably more conservative on the issues that in our
society today are often the litmus tests for ideology: abortion and
race. I also believe that it will be much more conservative on
issues of separation of church and state, but they have not yet
been presented to the Roberts Court. Also, it is a Court that,
overall, is very pro-business. The one area where the Roberts
Court has not been conservative is in its rulings against the Bush
55. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
56. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
57. See SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2.
58. Id. at 2. This percentage includes the Court’s 5-3 decision in Stoneridge
Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, but excludes the Court’s two 4-4 decisions in
Warner-Lambert v. Kent and Board of Education of New York v. Tom F. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 4-5.
60. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008).
61. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008).
62. Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).
63. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008).
64. See id. at 10-23.
65. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962.
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administration’s actions as to the Guantanamo detainees. But this
is because Justice Kennedy has joined Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in these cases. 66
These claims are contestable in almost every particular. The Roberts
Court at age three—that is, the Roberts Court we have seen thus far—is
not “notably more conservative” on race and abortion than any Court of
the past several decades. Nor is it likely that the Court, as currently
composed, will be particularly more conservative on the question of
church and state, and the Court’s rulings on enemy combatants are hardly
the only significant example of where “the Roberts Court has not been
conservative.” The claim the Roberts Court is “pro-business” is more
plausible, as discussed in the next section, but it does not have the clear
ideological significance Dean Chemerinsky suggests, nor is the Roberts
Court’s treatment of business-related cases remotely comparable to the
pre-New Deal Court.
The basis for Dean Chemerinsky’s claim on abortion is that the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal partial birth
abortion ban in Gonzales v. Carhart. 67 This was the first time the
Supreme Court had upheld a ban on a specific abortion procedure. The
decision also all-but overturned its 2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart
invalidating a similar state partial-birth abortion ban statute 68 and
signaled that the Court would be somewhat more deferential to
government restrictions on abortion, at least when confronted with a
facial challenge.
Gonzales v. Carhart certainly marks a shift in the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence, but not a seismic one. 69 The decision does not push the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence back fifty, let alone seventy-plus, years.
The Court did not recognize a constitutional right to an abortion until
1973. 70 That right, as subsequently limited in Planned Parenthood v.
66. Id. at 956.
67. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
68. 550 U.S. 914 (2000).
69. One way in which the Gonzales decision does appear to be significantly different
from its predecessors is in the rhetoric of the opinion particularly the continued reference
to the fetus as an “unborn child” in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 958. At the same time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court in Gonazales referred to those who perform abortions as “doctors,” whereas in his
Stenberg v. Carhart dissent he used the term “abortionist.” Compare Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct.
at 1622 (“This is an abortion doctor’s clinical description.”) with Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914,
947 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The majority views the procedures from the
perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when
confronted with a new method of ending human life.”).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Casey, 71 is still recognized by a majority of justices on the Court. While
there are at least two Justices, Scalia and Thomas, who are prepared to
overturn Casey and Roe, there remain five justices, including two of the
three justices who authored the joint opinion in Casey, who still embrace
a constitutional right to abortion.
Dean Chemerinsky writes that Gonzales v. Carhart changed the
standard from Casey and Stenberg for evaluating the constitutionality of
abortion restrictions because it held that an abortion restriction is not
facially unconstitutional unless it imposes an undue burden on a “large
fraction of women.” 72 This is certainly a change from Stenberg, in which
the Court held that an abortion restriction would be unconstitutional if it
placed an undue burden on some women, but it is also broadly consistent
with Casey (and completely foreshadowed by Justice Kennedy’s
Stenberg dissent). The “undue burden” test as applied in Stenberg was
arguably more restrictive of state legislatures than as announced in
Casey, so a repudiation of Stenberg on this point is not tantamount to a
rejection of a constitutionally protected abortion right, let alone the
reversal of 35 years of progressive abortion jurisprudence.
In Casey, the Court upheld the imposition of a 24-hour waiting
period against a facial challenge despite the fact that such a restriction
could impose an undue burden on some women. The joint opinion signed
by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor and Souter explicitly rejected the claim
that the particularly burdensome effects of the waiting period on some
women rendered the provision facially unconstitutional. 73 The same
Court invalidated Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement, but
not because it placed “an undue burden on some women” as Dean
Chemerinsky claims. 74 Rather, the Court explained, it concluded that the
“spousal notification requirement is . . . likely to prevent a significant
number of women from obtaining an abortion.” 75 In Gonzales v.
Carhart, on the other hand, the Court did not find that the federal law
would “prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an
abortion.” 76 To the contrary, it expressed doubt whether the law in
question would bar any women from obtaining an abortion at all, and left

71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87.
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 958 (emphasis added).
75. 505 U.S. at 893 (emphasis added). See also id. at 992 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (“The joint opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an
important factor in the “undue burden” analysis is whether the regulation “prevent[s] a
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.”) (emphasis added).
76. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.
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open the possibility of an as-applied challenge for those women who
might be placed at risk if denied the prohibited procedure.
More broadly, there is no indication the current Court is prepared to
further limit the abortion right as recognized in Casey and Roe, nor is
there any evidence that the Court is prepared to curtail other rights to
sexual autonomy recognized by the Court in the past several decades.
The Roberts Court has given no indication that it would adopt a more
restrictive test for the recognition of fundamental rights protected by the
Due Process Clause than was announced in Washington v. Glucksberg. 77
Furthermore, there are at least five justices on the Court who support the
holding of Lawrence v. Texas, 78 arguably the most liberal opinion on
sexual liberty in the Court’s history, let alone the last seventy years. That
the current Court is unlikely to plow new ground in this area is not
sufficient to make it “notably more conservative” than those that have
come before.
Dean Chemerinsky’s assertion that the Roberts Court at age three is
the “most conservative” Court since before Brown v. Board of
Education 79 does not hold up in the context of race either. Nor does his
more modest claim that the current Court is “notably more conservative”
than “the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts.” 80 As with abortion, it
is reasonable to maintain that the replacement of Justice O’Connor with
Justice Alito has made the Supreme Court modestly more conservative,
but not to maintain that the current Court has signaled its intent—let
alone already effectuated—a dramatic turn to the right.
In assessing this claim, it is important to clarify what it means for a
justice (or the Court) to be “conservative” on the question of race.
According to Dean Chemerinsky, the conservative position on race is
that which was embraced by Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1. 81 Specifically, the conservative position is that “the government must
be colorblind in its decisions,” 82 and that all race-conscious government
policies, including those intended to benefit historically disadvantaged
77. 521 U.S. 707 (1997) (holding that there is no a fundamental right to doctorassisted suicide under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
78. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute which rendered certain sexual
acts between members of the same sex a crime was unconstitutional).
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Note that in claiming that the Roberts Court is the “most
conservative” Court since the 1930s, he implicitly—if perhaps unintentionally—suggests
that the current Court is more “conservative” on the question of race than the New Deal
Court that accepted “separate but equal” and upheld Japanese internment.
80. Chemerinsky, supra note 13 at 956.
81. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
82. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962.
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racial minorities, must be subject to the most exacting scrutiny. To
sustain his claim, Dean Chemerinsky must show that the Roberts Court
has shown itself to be more conservative in this regard than its
predecessors, and this is something he fails to do.
In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that two school
districts’ voluntary attempts to achieve greater racial balance throughout
their jurisdictions were unconstitutional insofar as they relied upon a
student’s race when making school assignment decisions. Four justices,
led by Chief Justice Roberts, suggested that this was an easy case: “The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.” 83 Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s
judgment that the school assignment plans at issue should be subject to
strict scrutiny and, as implemented, were unconstitutional. Yet Justice
Kennedy was not willing to embrace colorblindness as “a universal
constitutional principle,” thereby forfeiting the possibility that school
districts could profitably consider race in order to encourage more
diverse student bodies. 84 Along with the dissenters, Justice Kennedy
explicitly accepted that combating “racial isolation” and achieving a
racially diverse student population is a “compelling interest” that could
justify narrowly tailored race conscious policies. 85
At least superficially, Parents Involved echoes the result in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke. 86 Four justices embraced strict
colorblindness; 87 four justices sought to impose a relaxed version of
heightened scrutiny to race-conscious policies designed to overcome the
legacy of segregation; and one justice split the difference. In each case,
the median justice—Justice Powell in Bakke, Justice Kennedy in Parents
Involved—accepted the dissenters’ view that diversity in education could
be a compelling governmental interest, but rejected the specific
educational policy at issue for being excessively blunt or crude in its use
of race.
Parents Involved is arguably more “conservative” than Bakke insofar
as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is less permissive than Justice
Powell’s. At the very least, Justice Kennedy’s rejection of the University
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan in Grutter v.

83. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
84. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
85. Id.
86. 438 U.S. 265
87. It should be noted that the four justice plurality in Bakke would have invalidated
the challenged admissions plan on statutory, as opposed to constitutional grounds.

2008]

GETTING THE ROBERTS COURT RIGHT

997

Bollinger 88 shows that he embraces a less permissive understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause than did Justice O’Connor in the latter part
of her career. 89 As a consequence, Dean Chemerinsky may be correct to
predict that the Roberts Court would decide Grutter differently than did
the Rehnquist Court. 90 Yet more is required for Chemerinsky to validate
his larger claim.
Even accepting that Parents Involved represents a rightward shift
from Grutter does not establish that the Roberts Court is more
conservative on race than the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts.
Due to Justice Kennedy, it is reasonable to view Parents Involved as
more accommodating of race-based remedial measures than either City
of Richmond v. Croson 91 or Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 92 These
opinions, taken together, could support an argument that at least the preGrutter Rehnquist Court was as conservative on race as the Roberts
Court has shown itself to be thus far.
Dean Chemerinsky suspects the Roberts Court will be “particularly
more conservative on the question of church and state” once it is
presented with a significant Establishment Clause case. He may well be
right, at least with regard to the approval of religious displays, but he
offers no evidence in support of this claim. Even if one assumes that
Justice Alito will adopt a more permissive approach to the Establishment
Clause than did Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy’s continued presence
as the swing vote in Establishment Clause cases suggests that any
doctrinal change will be relatively modest.
In a pair of 2005 cases, Van Orden v. Perry 93 and McCreary County
v. ACLU of Kentucky, 94 Justice Kennedy showed himself to be more
tolerant of public displays of religious symbols than was Justice
O’Connor. As a consequence, the Roberts Court may approve religious
displays that would have been invalidated by the late Rehnquist Court.
Yet there is reason to doubt that there will be any more significant
changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Among other things,
88. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School had a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body and that its admissions program
was narrowly tailored to achieve this objective).
89. Epstein, Ideological Drift, supra note 2, at 1535 (noting Justice O’Connor’s shift
to the left and suggesting Justice O’Connor would have been less likely to support the
University of Michigan Law School earlier in her career).
90. But see Epstein, Bush Imprint, supra note 8, at 666-67 (casting doubt on claim
Justice O’Connor would have supported school districts in Parents Involved cases).
91. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
92. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
93. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
94. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, in
which the Court held prayers delivered by clergy at a public high school
graduation unconstitutional. 95 There are almost certainly at least five
justices on the Court who would support that result today, as well as that
from Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, in which the Court
likewise held unconstitutional student-delivered prayers at public high
school football games. 96
The Roberts Court has indicated a willingness to enforce strict
limitations on taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, but this
has not resulted in a shift in the Court’s underlying constitutional
jurisprudence. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., the
Court held that denying taxpayer standing to a group alleging that
activities of the President’s “faith-based initiative” violated the
establishment clause. 97 In doing so the Court reaffirmed the general rule
that an individual’s status as a taxpayer, without more, is insufficient to
establish Article III standing. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the
slight exception to this rule established in Flast v. Cohen that allows for
taxpayer standing to challenge legislative enactments that allegedly
violate the Establishment Clause. 98 The Court’s holding reaffirmed a
distinction between such challenges to legislative and executive actions
articulated in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
the Separation of Church and State, 99 and other post-Flast cases. 100
While most of the justices acknowledged that Flast is an anomaly in the
Court’s standing jurisprudence, the Court left Flast standing. 101 So not
only is there no evidence to suggest the Court is prepared to lurch
rightward on Establishment clause issues, there has been no change in
the Court’s willingness to hear Establishment Clause challenges to
government conduct.
Abortion, race, and religion are certainly questions of constitutional
law that divide contemporary conservatives and liberals. So too do the
questions of executive power and the extent to which constitutional
protections, such as the writ of habeas corpus, apply to alleged enemy
95. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
96. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
97. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
98. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
99. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
100. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 628 (2004) (“In
the years following Flast, the Court embarked on a process of limiting the federal
taxpayer standing doctrine.”).
101. For some discussion of the problems with the Flast exception reaffirmed in Hein
see Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer and the Lorax, 20 REG. U L. REV. 175
(2008).
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combatants detained in the war on terror. As a general rule, judicial
conservatives are more deferential to assertions of Presidential
prerogative in military and foreign affairs, while judicial liberals are
more responsive to habeas claims or constraints on military power. On
these issues, the Roberts Court has not been conservative at all. To the
contrary, it has arguably been the most liberal or progressive Court ever.
Throughout the nation’s history, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to impose constitutional constraints on national security
measures. 102 As Chief Justice Rehnquist chronicled in All the Laws But
One, the timing of judicial consideration has tended to influence the
treatment of civil liberties during wartime. 103 As a descriptive matter,
courts are more likely to constrain federal authority and defend civil
liberties after the cessation of hostilities than during the pendency of
armed conflict or a perceived emergency. 104 Throughout the Civil War,
World War I, and World War II, in addition to lesser conflicts, few
constitutional constraints were imposed on the political branches. 105
Indeed, this may help explain (though not excuse) some of the federal
government’s grossest excesses, and the Supreme Court’s most shameful
examples of judicial passivity. 106
Given the history of judicial deference to wartime assertions of
federal power, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 107 and Boumediene v. Bush 108 are
remarkable opinions, particularly the latter. While Dean Chemerinsky
frames these cases in terms of judicial oversight of executive authority
and notes each was a rebuke to the Bush Administration, 109 they were
much more. Boumediene in particular represents a judicial rebuke to both
political branches as the Court invalidated Congress’ attempt to authorize
the Bush Administration’s with regard to the detention and trial of enemy
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay. Never before had a
Congressionally authorized assertion of the war power been held to be
unconstitutional during a time of armed conflict. Right or wrong, this
was a dramatic legal development that few would characterize as
conservative.
102. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 221 (1998) (noting “the reluctance of courts to decide a case against the
government on an issue of national security during a war”).
103. Id. at 224.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 223 (“The Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President.”).
106. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1944); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
107. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
108. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
109. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 972-73.
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The enemy combatant cases are hardly the sole example of the Court
adopting “liberal” positions. 110 In a series of decisions over the past three
years a five justice majority has continued to chip away at the imposition
of the death penalty. 111 Most notably among these has been Kennedy v.
Louisiana, in which the Court declared it unconstitutional to impose the
death penalty for a crime, such as child rape, that did not result in the
death of the victim. 112 As originally issued, the opinion purported to be
based, in part, on the existence of an emerging national consensus
against the use of capital punishment in such circumstances. 113 Yet when
revealed that part of the Court’s analysis rested on an erroneous claim,
specifically the majority opinion’s assertion that no federal law
authorized the imposition of the death penalty, Justice Kennedy made
clear that his, and the Court’s, judgment rested on its determination that
executing a brutal child rapist was unwise, inhuman, and unjust—and
therefore must be unconstitutional. 114
As important as Boumediene, Kennedy, and other cases in which the
Court deviated from its conservative reputation, arguably the most
consequential decision of the OT 2006—albeit one curiously omitted
from Dean Chemerinsky’s list of important cases 115 —was Massachusetts
v. EPA. 116 In this case, the Court loosened the constitutional
requirements for standing under Article III and altered other longstanding administrative law doctrines en route to authorizing (and in
effect mandating) the most expansive environmental regulatory
undertaking of all time. 117
The Massachusetts majority announced a new doctrine of “special
solicitude” to standing claims by sovereign states and a dramatically
110. Dean Chemerinsky acknowledges that the Court has embraced liberal positions in
other cases as well. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 972.
111. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), modified 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008);
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 530 U.S. 233
(2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 530 U.S. 286 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297
(2007).
112. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-46.
113. Id. at 2651-58.
114. Id. 2658-65.
115. See Chemerinsky, supra note 953-55.
116. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
117. For one account of how broadly Massachusetts v. EPA may have altered
administrative law doctrine, see Ronald Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient
Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75 (2007), available at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
For this author’s view, see Jonathan H. Adler. Warming Up to Climate Change
Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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relaxed application of standing requirements in citizen suit claims filed
against federal regulatory agencies. 118 The Court also adopted an
expansive reading of what constitutes an “air pollutant” under the Clean
Air Act so as to authorize the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions,
despite the agency’s disclaimer of any such authority, and rejected the
agency’s decision not to initiate regulation. 119 As a consequence, the
Environmental Protection Agency is now obligated to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, and will inevitably be
forced to regulate other greenhouse gas emissions as well. In both
practical and doctrinal terms, Massachusetts v. EPA was a monumental
decision, and it was not the work of a “conservative” court.
If the Court is not notably more conservative than its predecessors, is
it at least notably conservative in comparison to the nation? Not
particularly. On the major issues of the day, the Court’s holdings are at
the center, if not slightly to the left, of the American public. During the
2008 presidential campaign, both major party candidates criticized the
Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana invalidating the death penalty
for the crime of child rape and embraced the Court’s holding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms.
As Stuart Taylor observes:
To locate the Court’s current doctrines on the spectrum of public
opinion, consider six of the most contentious subjects that come
before the justices on a recurring basis: abortion; race; religion;
the death penalty; gay rights; and presidential war powers. On
every one of them, the Court’s precedents are to the left of, or
very close to the center. 120
Any purported conservatism in each of these areas, save affirmative
action, comes from the Court’s unwillingness to invalidate policies
adopted through the Democratic process. Thus whatever the merits of the
Court’s decisions in these areas, they do not show the Court to be out of

118. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
119. Id. at 528-32.
120. Stuart Taylor Jr., Barbarians on the Bench?, NAT’L J., July 12, 2008, at 16,
available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/or_20080712_9445.php (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009). Senator and Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama’s
criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana holding the death
penalty for child rape unconstitutional and his embrace of District of Columbia v.
Heller’s, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), central holding that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms is further evidence that, on the most contentious
issues of the day, the Court is not to the right of American politics.
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step with the American public, nor are they the product of a “far-right”
court. 121
IV. A “PRO-BUSINESS” COURT?
Another component of Dean Chemerinsky’s argument is that the
current Court is “pro-business,” particularly in comparison to its
predecessors. Specifically, Dean Chemerinsky claims “the Roberts Court
is the most pro-business Court of any since the mid-1930s.” 122 Dean
Chemerinsky is not alone in suggesting the Roberts Court is “probusiness” or drawing comparisons to the pre-New Deal Court. 123 To
support his claim, Dean Chemerinsky points to the Court’s decisions in
the areas of punitive damages, employment discrimination, and
preemption. 124 Elsewhere Dean Chemerinsky has suggested decisions in
other areas, such as antitrust, conform to the same pattern. 125 He largely
ignores other areas of business-related law, such as environmental
regulation, that would post a distinct challenge to his thesis. 126
Dean Chemerinsky is likely correct that, in important respects, the
Roberts Court could be seen as “pro-business.” But this is not because
the Court has been particularly aggressive in striking down government
regulation or erecting constitutional barriers to economic regulation. This
is no pre-New Deal Court. Nor is the Court’s apparent solicitude for
business concerns particularly rigid or ideological. To the contrary, the
results in most business law cases are quite lopsided, and rarely the result
of an ideological division on the Court. 127 In this area, 5-4 cases are the
121. Taylor, supra note 84, at 16 (“The point here is not that the public is always right;
. . . The point is that it’s misleading to brand as “far-right” and “radical” positions that in
fact are more liberal than, or near the center of, mainstream public opinion.”).
122. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962.
123. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
124. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962-72.
125. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court: Sharp Turn to the Right, CAL. B. J.,
Aug. 2007, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%20Resources/California%20Bar%20Journal/August2007&sCatHt
mlPath=cbj/2007-08_TH_01_supremecourt.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
126. See infra notes 127-175 and discussion therein. See also Envtl. Def. v. Duke
Energy, Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and
the Roberts Court: A Preliminary Examination, __ SANTA CLARA L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2009).
127. Michael Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Sept. 20,
2007, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26834/pub_detail.asp (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009) (“The Court’s business cases are not the products of an

2008]

GETTING THE ROBERTS COURT RIGHT

1003

exception, not the rule. 128 As a consequence, Dean Chemerinsky’s “probusiness” charge fits uneasily as part of his broader argument that the
confirmation of Justices Roberts and Alito have forged a working
conservative majority.
Business-related cases appear to occupy a major share of the Roberts
Court’s shrunken docket—over one-third of the cases accepted and
argued in each of the past three terms. 129 It also appears that business
advocates have had a relatively successful run of late. In OT 2006, for
example, the litigation arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed
briefs in fifteen cases, winning thirteen. 130 This may be evidence that the
business community has tremendous influence on the Court. Or it may
indicate that its attorneys are particularly good at picking winners and
marshalling the organization’s resources for those cases in which it can
have the greatest impact.
Some call the Court “pro-business” because there is no crusading
liberal or “progressive” justice on the Court. There is no justice ready to
follow William O. Douglas’ counsel to “bend the law in favor of the
environment and against the corporations.” 131 But this, in itself, does not
make the Court pro-business, particularly as there are no justices on the
Court ready to do the opposite. Rather, most justices appear to approach
the majority of business law cases as legal questions deserving of careful
legal analysis and resolution in accordance with the dictates of law. 132
ideologically divided, bloc- and swing-vote-driven Court. To the contrary, they display a
remarkable degree of judicial consensus. Even when the consensus breaks, the fault line
rarely follows ideological expectations.”) (emphasis added).
128. Even in OT 2006, the Court’s business-related docket was relatively free of
narrow divisions. Of the twenty-five business-related cases the Court heard that term, ten
were decided unanimously, eight were decided 8-1 or 7-2, and only three were split 5-4.
Id. at 3. If the net is cast more broadly, the results are the same. See Rosen, supra note
123. (“Of the [thirty] business cases last term, [twenty-two] were decided unanimously,
or with only one or two dissenting votes.”).
129. There is some ambiguity as to what constitutes a “business” case, and different
commentators have counted the cases differently. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 123
(“Forty percent of the cases the court heard last term involved business interests, up from
around 30 percent in recent years”); Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, supra note
127, at 1 (“In the 2006 term, twenty-five of sixty-seven cases dealt with business-related
issues.”). Whatever approach one uses, however, it is clear that the business-related
docket is a significant portion of the whole.
130. Rosen, supra note 123. The Chamber’s Robin Conrad called it their “best
Supreme Court term ever.” See Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision
Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at D01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
131. Rosen, supra note 123.
132. See Greve, supra note 127.
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With the exception of the punitive damages cases, the Court’s business
docket focuses on statutory matters in which Congress retains the upper
hand. Most cases require the Court to interpret or apply and enforce
legislative accommodations, and leave Congress ample room to correct
course. Had the Roberts Court invalidated the federal partial-birth
abortion ban, no legislature could have reenacted an equivalent measure.
Yet after the Court rejected Lily Ledbetter’s pay discrimination claim, 133
Congress retained the ability to revise the statute so subsequent claims
could go forward—as it did in early 2009. 134
It is difficult to know what constitutes “pro-business” in a given
case, as many (if not most) business-related cases pit one business
against another. The Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, for instance,
have certainly sided with the defendants, all of which have been
businesses. 135 Yet the plaintiffs in all but one of the Roberts Court’s
antitrust cases have been businesses as well. 136 These cases are not so
much “pro-business” as they are “pro-market” or “pro-consumer
welfare” and embody a Chicago School approach to antitrust analysis. 137
Large portions of the business community may favor this approach, but it
does not necessarily represent a business-oriented jurisprudence. Further,
because the Supreme Court’s antitrust cases are not a representative
sample of antitrust cases generally, it is a mistake to conflate plaintiff or
defendant win rates with a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias. 138
The Roberts Court, as a whole, has shown itself no more enamored
of large punitive damage awards than had been the Rehnquist Court. In
two decisions, Philip Morris USA v. Williams 139 and Exxon Shipping Co.

133. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
134. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2009.
135. See Josh Wright, Are the Roberts Court Antitrust Decisions Really Pro-Business?,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET, Mar. 20, 2008, available at http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2008/03/20/are-the-roberts-court-antirtust-decisions-really-pro-business/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2009).
136. See id. The one exception is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
There is some dispute over whether this case is all that significant. See Einer Elhauge,
Twombly—The New Supreme Court Antitrust Conspiracy Case, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 11, 2007), available at http://volokh.com/posts/1179785703.shtml
(noting author’s disagreement with those who believe Twombly is “the most practically
significant case” of OT 2006) (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
137. See Wright, supra note 135.
138. See Josh Wright, Abuse of Plaintiff Win Rates as Evidence that Antitrust Law Is
Too Lenient, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2008/10/14/abuse-of-plaintiff-win-rates-as-evidence-that-antitrust-law-istoo-lenient/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
139. 548 U.S. 346 (2007).
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v. Baker, 140 a divided Court struck down punitive damages awards as
excessive. 141 These decisions are certainly “pro-business,” insofar as the
business community has actively sought to reduce punitive damages in
civil litigation, yet they are not evidence of an increasing conservative tilt
on the Court.
The Supreme Court first held that “grossly excessive” punitive
damage awards violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1996 in BMW of North America v. Gore. 142 This
prohibition is in addition to the procedural safeguards state and federal
courts must follow before allowing the award of punitive damages. 143
Since BMW, the Court has continued to police the award of “excessive”
punitive damages. 144
Given the Court’s commitment to enforcing both procedural and
substantive limits on the award of punitive damages under the Due
Process Clause, its decision to reject a $79.5 million punitive damage
award on top of $821,000 in compensatory damages in Philip Morris did
not represent a major shift in the Court’s jurisprudence. 145 Nor did it
represent a particularly conservative result. Both Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented in Philip Morris, 146 as they had in BMW. 147 Whatever
their views of punitive damage awards generally, neither believes such
awards are meaningfully restrained by the Due Process Clause. This is no
less a “conservative” view than the more business-friendly hostility to
large punitive awards embraced by Justice Breyer’s majority opinion. 148
The decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker presented a slightly
more traditional right-left split on the Court—Justice Souter wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—but involved a much narrower question
of law. 149 Here, the Court rejected a multi-billion-dollar punitive damage
award that was several times the compensatory damages found. 150 Yet

140. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
141. Id.
142. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
143. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (holding punitive
damage awards must be subject to appellate review).
144. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
145. See Philip Morris , 549 U.S. 346.
146. Id. at 361-64.
147. BMW of N. America, 517 U.S. at 598-607.
148. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 348. The other justices in the majority were the Chief
Justice and Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Alito.
149. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
150. Id. The Court also split 4-4 over whether a corporate defendant could be liable for
punitive damages for the acts of its managerial employees and unanimously rejected
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the Court did not rest its judgment on the Due Process Clause. Indeed,
the Court did not even consider whether the award was “grossly
excessive” under BMW. 151 Rather, the Court only considered the narrow
question of whether, under the federal common law, such a punitive
award was excessive in a maritime case. 152 As a consequence, the import
of the Court’s holding is quite limited.
In the context of employment discrimination law, the evidence for a
conservative, pro-business swing in the Court’s jurisprudence is even
weaker. Dean Chemerinsky focuses his discussion on the case of
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Co., 153 in which a conservative, fivejustice majority held that a civil rights plaintiff’s pay discrimination
claims were precluded by the relevant statute of limitations. 154
Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that each
separate paycheck represented a stand-alone violation of the Civil Rights
Act from which the statute of limitations should run. 155 Rather, the Court
held, the statute of limitations began to run when the initial “discrete
discriminatory act” occurred. 156
The Ledbetter decision could have made it more difficult for victims
of prior pay discrimination to file claims under the Civil Rights Act. Yet
as Dean Chemerinsky notes, the extent of the impact will be dependent
upon whether the statute of limitations is tolled if an employee is
unaware the pay discrimination has occurred, and the Court did not
address this question. 157 Further, the decision does not affect pay
discrimination claims filed under other federal statutes, such as the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, and in early 2009 Congress passed legislation to
reverse the Court’s decision. 158
Even assuming that Ledbetter was a radically conservative, probusiness decision that altered long-standing employment discrimination
legal doctrines, it was not the only employment discrimination case the
Roberts Court decided in its first three years. As Dean Chemerinsky
notes, the Supreme Court decided three other employment discrimination
cases in OT 2007, and in each case ruled in favor of the employee and
Exxon’s claims that punitive damages under maritime law were preempted by the Clean
Water Act.
151. See id. Justices Scalia and Thomas also continued to note their disagreement with
BMW and its progeny. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2634-38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 2619-34.
153. Chemerinsky, supra note 965.
154. Ledbetter,127 S. Ct. 2162.
155. Id. at 2172-76.
156. Id. at 2177.
157. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 967.
158. See Stolberg supra note 134.
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against the employer. 159 These three cases, each of which concerned the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, are potentially important cases,
and undermine the claim that the Roberts Court is reflexively probusiness.
The third area of business-related cases Dean Chemerinsky examines
involve preemption. As a general matter, the business community
generally urges federal courts to find that state regulations and tort
liability are preempted by federal law, and such claims have been quite
successful in the Roberts Court thus far. “Every preemption case decided
so far by the Roberts Court has been decided in favor of finding
preemption,” Chemerinsky notes. 160 This was true when Dean
Chemerinsky wrote it. Since then, however, the Court rejected the
tobacco industry’s claims that some state law deceptive practice claims
are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 161
Moreover, other than in this tobacco case, Altria v. Good, the Roberts
Court’s preemption decisions demonstrate almost no signs of the Court’s
ideological divisions.
Most of the Roberts Court’s preemption decisions thus far have been
decided by quite lopsided margins. Riegel v. Medtronic 162 is perhaps the
most controversial of the Court’s recent preemption decisions, and it was
decided 8-1. 163 So, too, was Preston v. Ferrer, decided on the same
day. 164 Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Riegel; 165 Justice
Thomas in Ferrer. 166 The third preemption case decided that day, Rowe
v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association was unanimous. 167 This
was not an aberration from OT 2007. The biggest preemption case from
OT 2005, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 168 was unanimous as well.
Where the cases have been closer, the lack of predictable ideological
division has remained. In Watters v. Wachovia, 169 for example, the Court
159. CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter,
128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
See also Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 967-68.
160. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 968.
161. See Altria Group, Inc., v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). It is also worth noting that
in Exxon Shipping the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Exxon Shipping’s claim that
the Clean Water Act preempted punitive damages under the federal common law of
maritime. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2619.
162. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
163. Id.
164. 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
165. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 101-20 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
166. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
168. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
169. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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considered the preemptive effect of regulations governing mortgage
lenders promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
under the National Bank Act. The Court held, 5-3, that state licensing
and reporting requirements for mortgage lenders are preempted by these
regulations. 170 Of particular interest was the Court’s lineup. Justice
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for herself and Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer, and Alito. 171 Justice Stevens dissented, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. 172 Of further note, this was the first case
in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito disagreed, but it would
not be the last.
In the preemption cases, as in other business-related areas of the law,
it does appear that the Court, as a whole, is generally receptive to the
positions advocated by the business community. But insofar as this is the
case, it does not particularly support Dean Chemerinsky’s argument that
the Roberts Court is notably more conservative than its predecessors. 173
The Roberts Court’s pro-business leanings are independent of—and in
some cases in conflict with—its alleged conservative inclinations.
To the extent the Roberts Court is pro-business, it is not so because it
has embraced an aggressive agenda to impose constitutional constraints
on the government’s power to regulate economic activity or to rewrite
the law to favor business interests. In business-related areas other than
those analyzed by Dean Chemerinsky, such as environmental regulation,
the Court has been anything but sympathetic to business concerns. 174
Rather, the Roberts Court can be called pro-business insofar as it is
sympathetic to some basic business-oriented legal claims, reads statutes
narrowly, resists finding implied causes of action, 175 has adopted a
skeptical view of antitrust complaints, and does not place its finger on
the scales to assist non-business litigants. This is pro-business, to a
degree, and may even qualify as “conservative,” but it is also a more
modest orientation than Dean Chemerinsky would suggest.
V. COURTING JUSTICE KENNEDY
Dean Chemerinsky suggests that calling this Court, the “Roberts
Court,” may be something of a misnomer. Instead, he suggests, the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1563-64.
172. Id.
173. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 956.
174. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497; Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. 561 (2007). See also
Adler, supra note 126.
175. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
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current Court is more accurately described as the “Anthony Kennedy
Court.” 176 There is something to this claim. Yet insofar as the Roberts
Court at age three is really the Kennedy Court, this only undermines
Dean Chemerinsky’s claim that the Roberts Court is the “most
conservative” court since Justice Kennedy was born. 177
The claim that the Roberts Court is really the “Kennedy Court” is not
new. 178 After OT 2006, it appeared that Justice Kennedy literally
controlled the outcome in close cases. During that term he voted with the
majority in all twenty-four 5-4 decisions, even those that did not break
along ideological lines. 179 No other justice came close. 180 Perhaps even
more remarkably, Justice Kennedy only cast two dissenting votes over
the course of the entire term. 181 As the Court issued opinions in sixtyeight cases, this means that Justice Kennedy was in the majority a
remarkable ninety-seven percent of the time.
Justice Kennedy’s influence on case outcomes was not nearly so
pronounced in OT 2007. 182 He cast ten dissenting votes, and was in the
minority for several 5-4 decisions. 183 Rather than Justice Kennedy it was
Chief Justice Roberts who joined the Court’s prevailing side most often
(ninety percent). Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion in four of the Court’s 5-4 decisions, including Boumediene v.
Bush, 184 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 185 Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, 186 and Dada v. Mukasey. 187 So even as his influence
waned, Justice Kennedy remained a pivotal justice.

176. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 948.
177. Id. Justice Kennedy was born on July 23, 1936. Supreme Court of the United
States, The Justices of the Supreme Court, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
178. Among others, I made this claim in 2007. See Jonathan H. Adler, How
Conservative Is This Court?, NATL. REV. ONLINE (July 5, 2007), available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Y2Y3NjNkM2ZkYTcxNzQwYTBhZWZkNzEyZG
YyMWExMjE= (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
179. SCOTUSblog, supra note 9.
180. Justice Alito was the justice second-most likely to be in the majority in 5-4
decisions, and yet he was only in the majority for seventeen of the Court’s twenty-four 54 decisions. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Ben Winograd, End of Term “Super StatPack,” SCOTUSblog, June 26, 2008,
at 5, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/end-of-term-super-statpack/#mor-e7575 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
183. Id.
184. 128 S. Ct. 2229.
185. 128 S. Ct. 2641.
186. 128 S. Ct. 761.
187. 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008).
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Insofar as the current court is more properly considered Kennedy
Court, this further undermines Dean Chemerinsky’s claim of a
particularly conservative court. While Justice Kennedy is a moderately
conservative justice on most issues, he is anything but a reliable
“conservative” vote on a wide-range of politically charged issues. Justice
Kennedy frequently joins his more liberal colleagues in some of the most
contentious and controversial cases, including those involving capital
punishment, executive authority, standing, and sexual liberty. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy’s ideological separation from the next most
conservative justices on the Court is one of the things that makes such an
important median justice—what some would call a “super median.” 188
Justice Kennedy is the least likely member of the Court to uphold
government restrictions on speech. 189 Thus, he joined Justices Scalia and
Thomas in urging the Court to overturn portions of the Court’s 2003
decision in McConnell v. FEC 190 and void federal limits on political
advertising adopted as part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
reforms, rejecting the incremental approach adopted by Chief Justice
Roberts that would have preserved the recent precedent. 191 He also
joined Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse v. Frederick, 192 the “Bong
hits 4 Jesus” case, to ensure the Court’s ruling would not permit limits on
political speech by students. 193 Justice Kennedy was also the only
member of the Court to embrace the narrow holding of Flast v. Cohen, 194
rejecting the more conservative justices’ desire to revisit (if not overturn)
the holding that taxpayers could have standing to challenge legislative
enactments that violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. 195
If Roberts and Alito are consistent minimalists, Justice Kennedy has
a “maximalist” streak, making him the justice least likely to defer to the
political branches and among the most likely to reconsider past
precedents. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens’ opinion for the
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA that expanded citizen standing to sue for
188. See Lee Epstein & Tonya Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L REV. 37 (2008).
189. See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001). An updated version of this article, covering cases through
the 2002 term, is available. Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech
Cases, 1994-2002, available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
190. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
191. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
192. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
193. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
194. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
195. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Flast is correct and should
not be called into question.”).
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the violation of environmental laws and effectively ordered the EPA to
begin the federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 196 As noted
above, this decision worked a dramatic change in several doctrinal areas
and could have profound economic and political implications. Kennedy
also wrote the majority opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products v.
PSKS, Inc., 197 overturning a decades-old antitrust precedent, 198 and
another in Panetti v. Quarterman adopting an innovative and expansive
interpretation of federal law allowing convicted criminal defendants to
file additional habeas corpus petitions. 199 It was also Justice Kennedy
who embraced the consideration of international law and the Court’s own
moral compass to invalidate the death penalty for child rape in Kennedy
v. Louisiana. 200
Justice Kennedy has an over-sized impact on the Court’s decisions
because he is the median justice. Indeed, as noted above, Justice
Kennedy is something of a “super-median.” 201 A consequence is that the
Court’s jurisprudence will often reflect Justice Kennedy’s own: mildly
conservative in many areas of the law, but not so conservative in several
areas of profound significance. So long as Justice Kennedy is the median
justice, it will be hard to argue that we have the “most conservative”
Court since Justice Kennedy was born.
VI. WHEN THE ROBERTS COURT COMES OF AGE
As noted at the outset, it is difficult to know much about any court
after three years, and this is particularly true of the Roberts Court. With
an incredibly shrunken docket, and a lineup of justices that is likely to
change, any definitive judgment about the Court, or even its newest
justices, would be premature. Among other things, the issues upon which
Court commentators fixate today are unlikely to be those that preoccupy
the Court in the future. Nor are present ideological divisions likely to
dominate for an extended period of time. Today’s left-right divisions
over abortion and race could easily be eclipsed by the sorts of divisions
observed in other lines of cases, such as those between formalists and
pragmatists in the Apprendi-Booker sentencing guideline cases. 202 There
is also no way to know how the justices continued interaction, or the
196. 548 U.S. at 501-35.
197. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
198. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
199. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
200. 128 S. Ct. at 2645-65.
201. See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 188.
202. See, e.g., U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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potential addition of new justices in the years to come, will alter the
Court’s behavior. So even if we think we know the Roberts Court well at
this point, we must be ready to change our minds.
That said, is there any way the current Court could be called
“conservative?” There are certainly some issues, including the
constitutional protection of campaign-related speech and gun rights,
where the Court is to the right of its predecessors. On gun rights in
particular, it would be fair to call this Court the “most conservative”
since the 1930s, as there has never before been an opinion recognizing an
individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. 203
But this case does not establish that we have a particularly conservative
Court, overall.
It would also be fair to suggest the Roberts Court, right now, has a
more conservative trajectory. That is to say that unlike its predecessors—
the Warren and Burger Courts in particular—this Court appears unlikely
to embrace the continued progressive evolution of constitutional law
doctrines in the coming decades. In most areas, it seems more likely to
maintain, and refine, the status quo. The Roberts Court also seems
inclined to decide most cases as narrowly as possible, producing few
seismic shifts in any direction. Insofar as it can be maintained, this is
certainly a more modest or “conservative” approach to judging than the
Court has demonstrated in recent decades. It is also a far more
conservative approach to the law than what many would like or expect,
even if it does not make the Court the “most conservative” since before
the New Deal.
A final way the Roberts Court may be called conservative is in its
apparent tendency to decide cases on the most narrow available grounds.
In cases across a range of controversial issues—lethal injection, 204 voter
ID, 205 abortion, 206 child pornography, 207 among others—cases that were
expected to divide 5-4 were instead decided on narrow grounds by larger
majorities. This so-called minimalist approach narrows the range of
disagreement among the justices and minimizes doctrinal changes. In
many ways this is a significantly more conservative approach to judicial
review than exhibited by prior courts—and it may well become the
hallmark of the Roberts Court.
In sum, the Roberts Court has yet to show itself as dramatically more
ideologically conservative than its predecessors, let alone any Court in
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New. England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
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over 70 years. Such a modest and tentative assessment of the Roberts
Court may not excite the passions or motivate the base. Overstating the
Court’s ideological orientation has great appeal. Yet getting the Roberts
Court right is more important that proving the Roberts Court is right
already.

